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ABSTRACT: Theory suggests that firms confront a hold-up problem in dealing with 
workplace unionism: unions will appropriate a portion of the quasi rents stemming 
from long-lived capital. As a result, firms may be expected to limit their exposure to 
rent seeking by reducing investments, among other things. Although there is some 
empirical support for this prediction in firm-level studies for the United States, we 
investigate whether this is also the case in the different institutional context of 
Germany where the works council is the analogue of workplace unionism. Using 
parametric and nonparametric methods and establishment panel data, we find no 
evidence that the formation (dissolution) of a works council has an unfavorable 
(favorable) impact on investment. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Theoretische Überlegungen deuten darauf hin, dass Firmen 
durch Arbeitnehmervertretungen auf Betriebsebene wie Gewerkschaften mit 
einem „hold-up“-Problem konfrontiert werden, da letztere sich einen Teil der 
Quasi-Renten aus langlebigen Kapitalinvestitionen aneignen können. Deshalb 
mögen die Firmen ihre Anfälligkeit für derartiges „rent seeking“ dadurch verringern, 
dass sie ihre Investitionen zurückfahren. Während es für diese Hypothese 
empirische Bestätigungen durch Firmenstudien aus den USA gibt, untersuchen 
wir, ob dies auch in dem unterschiedlichen institutionellen Umfeld in Deutschland 
der Fall ist, wo statt Betriebsgewerkschaften Betriebsräte eine ähnliche Rolle 
spielen können. Unter Verwendung von parametrischen und nichtparametrischen 
Methoden sowie von Betriebspaneldaten finden wir keine empirischen Hinweise 
darauf, dass die Errichtung (bzw. Abschaffung) eines Betriebsrates einen 
negativen (bzw. positiven) Einfluss auf das betriebliche Investitionsverhalten hat. 
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In the present paper, we investigate the impact of the German works council on 
investment. The works council is the counterpart of the workplace union in other 
countries, where considerable attention has focused on the hold-up question: the 
insight that unions may reduce and distort investments in physical capital if 
investors anticipate union rent seeking. Ultimately, this new theory has to be 
integrated within the corpus of traditional structural models of investment (on 
which, see Bond and Van Reenen, 2003). The relatively poor performance of 
neoclassical investment models obviously makes for caution in interpreting results 
from empirical applications involving union rent seeking, but should not hamstring 
empirical investigation of the hold-up problem. That problem has to be seen as 
(another) feature of the firm’s environment that is important to understanding its 
investment behavior. 
 
Further, analysis of the works council might throw important light on the sub-theory 
because of the very different institutional framework in which the German entity is 
embedded. Although the works council has important codetermination powers at 
the workplace as well as extensive information and consultation rights, it cannot 
formally bargain over wages unless empowered to do so by the ruling collective 
agreement (negotiated at regional or industrial level by the relevant union and 
employer association). By the same token, the wide jurisdiction of the works 
council means that it has real bargaining power, and unsurprisingly wages have 
been shown to be higher in establishments with works councils (e.g. Addison, 
Schnabel, and Wagner, 2001; Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003). Nevertheless, the parent 
collective agreement, underwritten by the peace obligation (works councils cannot 
strike a plant), may help to limit rent seeking at the workplace. More creatively, 
participation in decision-making process through the aegis of the works council 
might encourage workers to take a longer run view of their companies. A partial 
decoupling of the issues of wealth creation and its distribution in the German case 
can translate into an attenuation of the hold-up problem. 
 
There is a growing literature on the effects of works councils on various aspects of 
firm performance (for a survey, see Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2004). But 
there has been almost no investigation of the works council-investment nexus, 
which relation is fundamental to the performance question. Moreover, there is the 
unsettled issue of unobserved plant heterogeneity. Most studies have examined 
the effect of works council presence on the outcome indicators without considering  
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the stable but unobserved characteristics of the firm that may be associated with 
performance and the frequency of the works council institution. This omission may 
be of particular importance in the case of investment, leading us to provide within-
plant estimates of works council impact. Using changes in works council status 
gives us more confidence in drawing inferences as to causality.
1 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II we briefly outline the hold-up model. 
Although the theory is ultimately ambiguous, the empirical evidence on the 
association between worker representation and investments in physical capital, 
reviewed in section III, points fairly consistently to lower investments in the 
presence of unions and, in one study, German works councils. In section IV we 
introduce our nationally representative dataset. Section V contains the results of 
our empirical inquiry, providing investment function estimates as well as an 
alternative matching approach to determining the impact of works councils on 
investment. These parametric and nonparametric methodologies yield findings that 
differ sharply from the Anglo-Saxon experience. In section VI we interpret our 
results and draw some conclusions. 
 
2. THEORY 
Theoretical considerations suggest that unions can have positive as well as 
negative effects on investment. In the traditional model, the union-set wage is 
represented as an exogenous change in the price of labor, and the firm adjusts 
employment along the labor demand curve. In this case, the union premium or tax 
is levied on labor. Union firms substitute away from expensive labor, but the net 
effect on investment is unclear: it depends on the degree of substitutability 
between capital and labor and the magnitude of the scale effect as the premium 
filters through into higher product prices and output falls. 
 
By contrast, the modern view is that unions tax capital, that firms respond 
unambiguously by cutting investment, and that the wage is endogenous. The idea 
                                            
1   As we will be exploiting changes in works council status, it should be noted that works councils 
are mandatory in all plants with five or more permanent employees. They are not automatic, 
however, and for a works councils to be elected just three employees with voting rights (i.e. 
aged at least 18 years) must first call for an electoral board to be convened. Once this 
procedure has been set in motion, the establishment of a works council is a fait accompli, with 
the electoral board holding the election. By the same token, works councils can equally easily 
lapse. This will occur if no re-election takes place, or if works councilors cease actively to meet 
or otherwise quit the plant. The entity can therefore be set up or dissolved at any point in time 
by the plant’s employees. Nevertheless, we shall see that either event is rather rare.  
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is that unions expropriate part of the quasi-rents that form part of the normal (i.e. 
competitive) returns to capital but which are vulnerable to capture once investment 
in specialized plant and equipment has been made. Familiarly, such assets will 
continue in use as long they earn a return above their alternative use; the more 
specific the asset, the bigger the scope for union rent seeking. Of course, with the 
relation-specific capital in situ, higher wages are unlikely to influence the use of the 
asset, but firms will anticipate reduced returns to such capital and invest less. 
 
This is the so-called ‘hold-up’ problem, first carefully analyzed by Grout (1984). 
Consider a simple one shot two-stage game. In the first stage, the firm chooses a 
level of capital (high/low) and in the next the union chooses the wage (high/low). 
By backwards induction, the union will always choose a high wage at stage two 
and, knowing this, the firm will always choose a low investment strategy at stage 
one. As noted, the union tax on investment will vary directly with the specificity of 
the asset and its longevity. The tax would vanish were the union able to commit 
itself to a low wage strategy by posting a bond or hostage to a third party, or where 
there was bargaining over investment as well as wages. However, neither 
arrangement is other than sporadically encountered in the real world.
2 
 
Collective bargaining is of course repeated over time rather than being a one-shot 
exercise and, abstracting from an end-game scenario, repeated games offer a 
solution to the hold-up problem since opportunistic behavior can in principle be 
appropriately punished (e.g. van der Ploeg, 1987). An important issue in the 
literature has been the degree to which unions discount the future. In particular, it 
has been argued that because union members do not have property rights in the 
union they will be rationally myopic and discount the future at a higher rate than 
shareholders. And this tendency will be reinforced by the greater influence of older 
workers in union councils (Hirsch and Prasad, 1995). Accordingly, much hinges in 
a repeated game context on the union’s discount factor and the success of firms in 
extending the union’s horizon (including greater recourse to debt), as well as 
inefficient defensive strategies such as the maintenance of inefficient capital or 
                                            
2   There is also a potential hold-up problem on the other side of the employment relation. The 
usual example given is employer capture of the quasi rents accruing to workers from their co-
investments in firm-specific human capital (Metcalf, 2003), which problem is commonly ‘elided’ 
by noting that the firm is longer lived than the employment relation and that its owners (unlike 
union members) have marketable property rights. Future cash flows will be prejudiced by the 
consequences for wage cost of a damaged reputation. But there is also an example in 
investment and employment determination. In their extension of the Espinoza and Rhee (1989) 
model, Addison and Chilton (1998) argue that the ability of the union to punish the firm for 
opportunistic behavior (specifically, cheating on employment) may actually be increased in 
circumstances of finite capital durability. However, for a firm discount factor close to 1, it will not 
pay the employer to cheat.  
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plants to facilitate substantial cuts in employment as a short-run profit-maximizing 
response to wage demands (for a discussion, see Baldwin, 1983). 
 
There is a strong presumption in the unions-and-investment literature, therefore, 
that greater worker representation will depress investments in physical and 
intangible capital – the Grout result – and lead to greater reliance on debt 
financing. However, two theoretical caveats and a qualification are in order. First, 
Addison and Chilton (1998) have shown that union opportunism alone does not 
necessarily underpin suboptimal investments in physical capital and that – 
irrespective of the union’s horizon or the productive life of capital – sufficient 
patience on the part of the firm can yield self-enforcing contracts that are efficient 
with respect to employment and investment. In other words, the efficient outcome 
may depend crucially on the firm’s discount factor. Second, uncritical extension of 
the hold-up model to investments in intangible capital (i.e. R&D) should be 
resisted. As noted by Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003, p. 299), the 
tendency toward strategic R&D “undermines the analytical clarity of the Grout 
result.” Specifically, in circumstances of a patent race in R&D, an increase in union 
power can increase employment and market share and in turn lead to increased 
R&D to preserve market share. 
 
As for the qualification, it is simply that the agency of worker representation 
considered in the present treatment is the German works council rather than the 
trade union to which the theory refers – and the Anglo-Saxon union on which the 
empirical literature focuses. As noted earlier, the works council is embedded in a 
dual system of industrial relations wherein its wage bargaining role is 
circumscribed to a greater or lesser extent by the sectoral collective bargaining 
agreements negotiated by the unions. While works councils are not allowed to 
bargain over wages unless expressly authorized by the relevant sectoral 
agreement, their extensive rights of information, consultation and codetermination 
in many other issues mean that works councils have a strong influence which can 
be used for rent-seeking and which often results in higher effective wages paid 
(see Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2001). On the other hand, the dual system 
of industrial relations in Germany may mean that there is sufficient divorce of 
distributive from production issues for the works council to focus on the latter, 
especially in circumstances where its own powers – and in particular those of 
codetermination or joint decision-making – encourage the work force to take a 




3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the extant empirical literature at firm/establishment level is provided in 
Table 1. Although most of the studies in the table tackle more outcome indicators 
than investments in physical capital alone, we shall focus our narrative on the 
results for tangible capital and simply note some wider results (most notably on 
profits) as necessary. 
 
(Table 1 near here) 
 
The study by Hirsch (1991) in row 1 of the table sets the standard for the rest. It 
derives by survey its own measure of union presence, applies the distinction 
between the direct effects of unionism and the indirect effects stemming from the 
wage premium – the latter necessitating the estimation of an auxiliary profits 
equation – and identifies nonlinearities in union effects. It also tests the robustness 
of its principal results, and looks to supportive findings for other investment 
outcomes and other indicators suggested by the theory (e.g. higher debt-equity 
ratios). Hirsch reports solid evidence of the distortionary long-run effects of union 
rent seeking: union companies invest around 20 percent less in plant and 
equipment than do similar nonunion companies (see also Hirsch, 1992). 
 
The next two studies in the table are illustrative of the difficulty confronted by 
analysts in obtaining firm-based measures of unionism. Bronars and Deere (1993) 
fashion their density indicator from industry-level values from the CPS. They 
obtain somewhat weaker results than Hirsch for investment in tangible capital (but 
stronger results for some other indicators such as R&D and debt-equity ratios). 
The sensitivity of matching industry unionization rates to individual firm data is 
explicitly tackled in the study by Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994). The authors 
compare a measure of firm-level unionism derived from BLS contract information 
with CPS data to gauge the adequacy of the latter ‘matching’ measures, using 
coverage data from Hirsch’s (1991) survey to obtain an estimate of the 
measurement error in the former estimate. Although their focus is on 
measurement issues, they again find that higher union coverage is associated with 
lower investment in plant and equipment. But the direct effects of unionism are 
poorly determined in this treatment (at least for physical investment, if not for the 
other outcomes investigated.) 
 
The study in row 4 of the table is of interest because it seeks to test the argument 
that unions reduce asset-specific  investments, as underpins the bargaining  
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problem emphasized in the theory. Assuming that asset specificity is directly 
associated with investment (as well as with excess market value and employment 
growth), Cavanaugh (1998) looks to the union effect on investment being amplified 
by asset specificity and hence includes an interaction term between the two 
variables in his investment equation. As can be seen, he obtains strongly negative 
coefficient estimates for both the union measure and the interaction term. He also 
reports adverse union effects on the other outcome indicators examined (firm 
profitability and employment growth). 
 
Only one of the firm studies in the table is able to exploit a time series for 
unionization. In an approach that has found favor in the profits literature, Fallick 
and Hassett (1999) consider the effects of union representation elections on firm 
performance over a sample period of more than two decades. For their ‘surprises’ 
model they consistently report evidence of materially lower investment in the wake 
of union wins. By way of underscoring the magnitude of the union tax they 
compute that its effect is equivalent to a 33 percentage point hike (from .34 to .67) 
in the corporation tax. 
 
The last two entries in the table are the only non-U.S. studies. Addison, Kraft and 
Wagner (1993) consider the impact of the German works council on capital 
investment, the subject of our larger inquiry. They find that gross investment is 
between one-fifth and one-third lower in a works council plant than in its 
counterpart without the institution, which at first blush suggests that the effects of 
workplace representation in Germany seem no less severe than in the United 
States. However, the study is based on a small sample of likely unrepresentative 
plants, and the authors duly note the fragility of their investment equations. Using 
a much larger sample, Hübler (2003) estimates that works council presence is 
associated with higher levels of expansion investment, ICT investment, and other 
investment in medium-sized German establishments. Using a three-equation 
model, this positive overall effect is found to stem exclusively from the indirect 
effects of works councils operating through reorganization and training. On the 
other hand, the direct effect of works councils on investment is negative albeit 
statistically insignificant (see also the companion study by Gerlach, Hübler, and 
Meyer, 2002, where this inverse association is statistically significant in one 
specification). It should be noted, however, that the studies in rows 6 and 7 of the 
table rely on single cross sections of data and only make use of information on 
works council presence (rather than changes in works council status), so that any 




Statistical limitations notwithstanding, the firm- and plant-level studies point nearly 
universally to reduced investment in tangible capital under unionism.
3 Interestingly, 
the same holds true of the handful of industry-level studies, not summarized in our 
table. Indeed, for a sample of 18 Canadian industries, 1967-87, Odgers and Betts 
(1997) estimate that were an industry with zero union representation to attain the 
sample average union density of 44 percent, its gross (net) investment rate would 
be reduced in the range 66 to 74 (18 to 25) percent relative to the status quo ante. 
As do several of the firm studies, the authors test for (and detect) a nonlinear 
association between the union measure and investment, although unlike those 
studies the indirect union effect on investment operating through reduced 
profitability is economically insignificant. 
 
Another industry-level study, this time for Britain, again reports strongly negative 
effects of unions on investment. In an analysis of two datasets using first 
differences and panel methods, and distinguishing between union recognition and 
union density, Denny and Nickell (1992) report that a firm with a recognized union 
and an average level of union density would have an investment rate some 28 
percent lower than an equivalent firm with no unions, cet par.
4 Adding in the 
indirect effects of unions – in the model, the wage effect is positive and the 
productivity effect negative – this estimate is reduced to a still very substantial 16 
percent (in the competitive sector). 
 
Aggregation problems ensure that we should focus on the firm in investigating 
union impact on investment,
5 but one potentially interesting result contained in 
Denny and Nickell (1992, p. 882, fn. 9) is their finding of a positive influence of 
joint consultative committees – joint meetings of employers and managers 
concerned with consultation rather than negotiation – on investments in plant and 
machinery. Given that this body is akin to the German institution, might not the 
works council be sufficiently concertative and removed from negotiation to even 
have a positive influence on investment? 
 
                                            
3   We note parenthetically that the only studies pointing to insignificant or positive union effects on 
investment do not have data on actual investments; see respectively, Machin and Wadhwani 
(1991) and Benson (1994). 
4   The authors rationalize the positive coefficient estimate for union density on the grounds that, if 
there is a union and new capital is being installed, it pays management not “having to make 
separate arrangements for a substantial body of non-union workers” (Denny and Nickell, 1992, 
p. 882). 
5   But note that firm-level analysis may understate the overall impact of unionization on investment 
where threat effects apply. If  nonunion firms respond by raising wages to preempt the 
unionization of their employees, then their investment may fall as well.  
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4. DATA  
Our data are taken from the IAB Establishment Panel of the Institute for 
Employment Research of the Federal Labor Agency. Each year since 1993 
(1996), this panel has surveyed several thousand establishments from all sectors 
of the economy in Western (Eastern) Germany. It is based on a stratified random 
sample – strata for 16 industries and 10 size classes – from the population of all 
establishments with at least one employee covered by social insurance. To correct 
for panel mortality, exits, and newly-founded units, the data are augmented 
regularly, yielding an unbalanced panel. Participation of establishments is 
voluntary, but the response rates (which exceed 70 percent) are high compared 
with other non-official German firm panel studies. The first wave of the IAB panel 
(1993) included 4,265 West German plants; and in 1996, the East German 
establishment panel started with 4,313 plants. Overall, the IAB panel has 
increased in size every year – and as of 2003 covers approximately 16,000 
establishments – to facilitate regional analysis at the level of federal states. 
 
Data are collected in personal interviews with the owners or senior managers of 
the establishments by professional interviewers. The panel is created to serve the 
needs of the Federal Labor Agency, and so its focus is on employment-related 
matters. Note that the IAB panel is the only nationally representative longitudinal 
sample of establishments in Germany that can be used to investigate works 
council impact. Details of the IAB panel (including information on the 
questionnaire(s) and how to access the data) are given in Kölling (2000). 
 
In investigating the impact of works councils on investment, our study uses 
information on the presence (or otherwise) of a works council in a plant during the 
interval 1998 to 2003.
6 The relevant question was posed to all establishments in 
1998, 2000, 2002 and 2003.
7 The crucial information is the course of a plant’s 
works council status through time, which allows us to identify the impact of a works 
council on investment through within-plant changes in the presence of a works 
council rather than relying on between-plant comparisons. Therefore, we 
categorize plants into four different groups. First, there are plants which never had 
a works council across all years for which information is available. The second 
group comprises plants that did not have a works council in 1998, but 
                                            
6   Although employees in all establishments with five or more permanent employees can elect a 
works council, only one in six establishments in the private and public sector had a works 
council in 2000 (for details, see Addison et al., 2003). 
7   In the missing years, the question was only asked of panel accessions, which perforce cannot 
be used in our longitudinal analysis.  
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subsequently reported that they had one in 2000 which was still operational in 
2002 and 2003. The third group is made up of plants that always had a works 
council. Finally, the fourth group consists of establishments in which the works 
council was dissolved (i.e. plants that reported the existence of a works council in 
1998 but not in 2000 until 2003). All plants changing their works council status 
after 2000 were excluded from the analysis. Our focus, then, is upon the impact of 
a regime shift (the setting up or abandonment of a works council) occurring 
between 1998 and 2000 on investment in the following years (2000 to 2002). 
 
The dependent variable in our analyses is average investment divided by sales in 
the period 2000 to 2002.
8 We are able to use data on total investment as well as 
information on (the share of that investment that is) ‘expansion investment’ as 
opposed to replacement investment. Because sales are measured differently for 
establishments from the banking and insurance sectors and for public sector 
establishments, these industries have to be excluded from the analysis. 
Furthermore, the usable sample shrinks considerably due to attrition or missing 
values but, depending on the estimation strategy pursued, there are still several 
hundred to several thousand plants that can be observed. 
 
5. FINDINGS 
In our empirical analysis we make use of three alternative estimation strategies to 
ascertain how a works council affects investment. In each case, we investigate 
whether the setting up (dissolution) of a works council between 1998 and 2000 
inhibits (increases) investment between 2000 and 2002. This is achieved by 
comparing the investment behavior of plants setting up (abandoning) a works 
council with those of establishments that never (always) had a works council. Each 
approach is carried out separately for total investment and for expansion 
investment. 
 
                                            
8   We have divided investment by total sales in order to avoid scale effects. Information on both 
total sales and investment in year t is asked for in the survey conducted in the following year. If 
there were missing values for investment or sales in any of the three years, we calculated the 
average using information from the remaining two years. In the event that we had usable 
information on establishment investment (divided by total sales) for just one year, the plant was 
dropped from the sample.  
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ESTIMATING INVESTMENT FUNCTIONS 
In the first two approaches we estimate a reduced form investment function that 
employs the standard covariates used in the literature, in so far as these are 
available in our data set.
9 Our first explanatory variable is an establishment’s 
growth in sales between 2000 and 2002, since a rising demand for goods and 
services may only be satisfied through an increase in the capital stock, via 
expansion investment. The economic performance of an establishment is also 
expected to have a positive impact on investment: the better the profit situation, 
the higher the expected return on investment, and the more plentiful the financial 
resources available for investment. Therefore, a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not the profit situation in 1999 was either very good or good is utilised 
here. Although we have normalized the investment measure by total sales, we 
include establishment size as a further independent variable. According to 
Schumpeterian arguments, there should exist a positive relationship between a 
firm’s size and its innovation as well as investment behavior. In addition, 
investment per unit of sales may be greater in large firms due to their easier 
access to financial markets and greater willingness to accept risk. We use both the 
number of employees and its square to pick up any non-linearity in the relationship 
between establishment size and the investment ratio. We also deploy two dummy 
variables reflecting formal collective bargaining arrangements: whether or not the 
establishment has concluded a collective agreement (either through the employers 
association at sectoral level or with the union directly at firm level) and is thus 
subject to union wages. In both cases, investment might be higher if firms 
substitute away from expensive labor; but if collective bargaining takes place at 
firm level, the firm also faces an increased risk of rent capture, thereby inhibiting 
investment. Next, as a crude representation of the dynamic adjustment of the 
capital stock, we include the lagged dependent variable; specifically, the average 
of investment divided by total sales over the three years 1997-99. Finally, we 
deploy ten industry dummies to capture sectoral differences in investment 
behavior (possibly due to different positions in the business cycle), and also enter 
                                            
9    For extended discussions of theoretical and empirical investment equations, see Jorgensen 
(1963), Hirsch (1991), and Bond and Van Reenen (2003). We do not have information on the 
price of capital or on the investment and/or financial constraints confronted by individual firms, 
although some of the determining factors here may in part be indirectly captured by certain of 
our other explanatory variables such as firm size and industry affiliation. Further, because our 
econometric specifications are not explicitly derived from optimal investment behavior, given 
some specified structure of adjustment costs, the reduced form models used here only 
“represent an empirical approximation to some complex underlying process that has generated 
the data” (Bond and Van Reenen, 2003, p. 34). Recent investment studies using German firm-
level data include Neubäumer and Kohaut (2002), Bond, Harhoff, and Van Reenen (2003), and 
Kirchesch (2004).  
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a dummy for Eastern Germany. Although the economic situation remains worse in 
post-communist Eastern Germany which should therefore serve to depress 
investment, by the same token the heavy subsidization of capital in the east 
should act as spur to investment. 
 
Our main focus is of course on the three dummy variables representing the 
various works council regimes; that is, whether a works council was set up, 
dissolved, or always in existence. (Establishments that never had a works council 
form the reference group.) A significant negative coefficient estimate in respect of 
works council formation, for example, would imply that these plants invest less 
than do their counterparts that remained free of work councils. It is also of interest 
to determine whether the effect of works council dissolution significantly differs 
from that continuous works council presence, and whether plants that have 
recently abandoned a works council behave similarly to those that never had one. 
 
OLS results for our reduced form investment equation allowing for separate 
intercepts in the case of each works council regime are presented in Table 2.
10 It 
can be seen that the coefficient estimates for most of our control variables have 
the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better. 
Sales growth, a good profit situation of the plant, and a plant’s location in Eastern 
Germany are all associated with higher investment, whereas establishment size 
and the existence of collective agreement do not seem to play a role. Average 
investment between 1997 and 1999 makes a large contribution to the explained 
variation of investment between 2000 and 2002, and the relationship is stronger 
for total investment. This seems plausible since total investment is composed of 
expansion investment and replacement investment, and the latter – reflecting the 
depreciation of the capital stock – should evince stronger autocorrelation through 
time. 
 
(Table 2 near here) 
 
Focusing on our works council dummies, we see that establishments that always 
had a works council record significantly higher investment than reference group 
plants. This difference in levels should, however, not be overemphasized. 
Although this relation may reflect plants’ reactions to higher labor costs associated 
with permanent works council presence (as found by Addison, Schnabel and 
                                            
10  All computations were performed at the Institute for Employment Research of the Federal Labor 
Agency, using Stata/SE 8.2. To facilitate replication and extensions, the do-files are available 
from thorsten.schank@wiso.uni-erlangen.de.  
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Wagner, 2001), it also could indicate that both groups of plants are so different in 
many respects that we have non-overlapping distributions of the covariates (see 
below). More interesting, and more important for a causal interpretation of works 
council effects, are the point estimates of the dummies indicating a change in 
works council status. We see that the coefficient estimate for the dummy indicating 
the formation of a works council is altogether insignificant for both total and 
expansion investment. Similarly, plants that had abandoned their works council do 
not record higher investment than those plants in which a works council continued 
in operation. Neither result favors the hypothesis that works councils inhibit 
investment. By way of caution, however, we note that our results are based on 
only a small number of changers: the regression sample includes 1,309 (660) 
plants that never (always) had a works council, but only 19 (26) reporting the 
formation (abandonment) of a works council. 
 
The preceding estimation strategy attributes any changes in investment behavior 
between the four different works council regimes to intercept shifts, thereby 
assuming that the other covariates have the same impact throughout. This 
restriction is relaxed in our second approach in which our investment equations 
only use data pertaining to plants that did not experience a change in works 
council status (i.e. we fit separate investment equations to data from plants that 
either never had or always had a works council). The estimated coefficients are 
then used to predict investment in plants that changed their works council status. 
More precisely, the estimated parameters from the regression containing plants 
that never (always) had a works council are used to simulate the hypothetical 
investment behavior of plants that set up (abandoned) a works council had they 
not changed regime. Assuming that the unobserved factors are uncorrelated with 
works council presence, any difference between the average predicted value and 
the actual value of investment in plants setting up or abandoning a works council 
is due to different parameters in the investment function of the groups of plants 
that changed or did not change their works council status. This could be due to an 
intercept shift or due to different impacts of the other covariates, both of which 
elements may be regarded as the effect of a works council formation 
(abandonment) on investment. 
 
(Tables 3 and 4 near here) 
 
The results of estimating our investment equation separately for establishments 
that either never had or always had a works council are given in Table 3. They are 
more or less in line with the results in Table 2. That said, it can be seen that the  
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explained variation of investment is much higher for those plants that always had a 
works council. (Such plants are considerably larger on average; see Table  5 
below.) 
 
Using the estimated parameters from these regressions, we can predict 
investment (normalized by sales) for those plants which have set up (abandoned) 
a works council and compare these values with the actual investment of the 
respective groups. If works councils do indeed inhibit investment, we would expect 
to observe a lower (greater) actual than predicted value for plants setting up 
(abandoning) a works council. Table  4 shows that the difference between 
predicted and actual investment is not significantly different from zero for plants 
that have set up a works council. Actual total investment is even significantly 
smaller than the predicted value for plants abandoning a works council, although 
the difference in expansion investment is insignificant. By way of summary, our 
second estimation strategy reconfirms the findings of the first approach and does 
not indicate any evidence of a negative impact of works councils on investment. 
 
A MATCHING APPROACH 
The above approaches employ OLS methods that are based on the assumption of 
a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the covariates. 
Relatedly, OLS does not take into account the possibility of a non-common 
support (i.e. a non-common range of values of the covariates) between plants that 
set up (abandoned) a works council and plants in which works councils were never 
(always) present. This can result in extrapolating outside the common support 
when using parametric techniques. Therefore, in our third strategy we employ the 
matching method, which is a nonparametric (or semi-parametric) approach to 
identify the impact of a specific treatment on certain outcomes and which allows a 
causal interpretation of treatment effects.
11 
 
In our case, the treatment is the formation of a works council between 1998 and 
2000, and the outcome is average investment divided by total sales in the 
succeeding years.
12 The (average) treatment effect is identified by choosing a 
                                            
11  Matching analysis and the causal interpretation of the effects identified can be traced back to 
Rubin (1974). Latterly, the approach has become very popular in the evaluation of labor market 
programs; see, for example, Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999). 
12  Analogously, we also investigate the treatment effect of abandoning the works council, where 
the control group now consists of all those plants which always had a works council. Due to 
space constraints, we will only refer to the formation of a works council as a treatment.  
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subset of the control group of untreated plants (those plants that never had a 
works council) having observable characteristics in 1998 as similar as possible to 
the treated group (those plants setting up a works council after 1998). Conditioning 
on the observables, the method assumes that the only remaining difference 
between the two groups of plants is the treatment status. Accordingly, the average 
impact of the treatment can be recovered through a comparison of the investment 
means of both groups. The matching analysis avoids the two problems mentioned 
earlier. First, it does not rely on a linear relationship in the investment equation. 
Second, the analysis is restricted to the region of common support; consequently, 
the estimated treatment effect is only valid for the region where both data on the 
treated plants as well as data from the control group is observed.
13 
 
In our particular context, the identifying assumption when using matching methods 
(i.e. the conditional independence assumption) is that plants setting up a works 
council would have displayed the same investment behavior as the control group 
in the (hypothetical) case that they had not done so. To satisfy this condition, we 
must take into account all variables that are expected to exert an influence on the 
decision to set up a works council and on investment. 
 
We apply propensity score matching, wherein the selection of the control group is 
carried out on the basis of the probability that a unit has received treatment, 
conditional on the observed variables. The propensity score is obtained from a 
probit regression of a dummy variable indicating whether or not a works council 
was formed between 1998 and 2000 on a vector of covariates consisting of the 
following arguments: the number of employees (and the squared number of 
employees); the percentages of part-time employees, of female employees, and of 
blue-collar workers; dummy variables for collective agreements concluded at 
either of two levels (sectoral or firm); dummy variables denoting branch-plant 
status, the profit situation, and the legal form of the enterprise; and dummies for 
the age of the establishment (formed within the last five years, or earlier), the 
region (Western vs. Eastern Germany), and industry affiliation.
14 We then stratified 
the data by sector and region (Eastern versus Western Germany). For each 
establishment in which a works council was set up, the most similar unit (in terms 
of its propensity score) among those plants in the same cell that never had a 
works council was selected (so-called nearest neighbour or one-to-one matching). 
                                            
13  Note that both regression and matching analysis require the decision to set up a works council, 
conditional on the covariates, to be independent of the unobservables. 
14    For an econometric analysis of the determinants of works council presence and their 
introduction that is also based on the IAB panel and makes use of these covariates, see 
Addison et al. (2003).  
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Then, the mean investment of the treated establishments was compared with the 
mean of the matched non-treated establishments. 
 
(Table 5 near here) 
 
As mentioned above, the parametric strategies used earlier do not take into 
account that the distributions of treated and untreated plants may not sufficiently 
overlap. In fact, there are some marked differences within the two pairs of works 
council regimes in 1998 (i.e. before a works council was set up or abandoned). 
Table 5 examines these differences for several workplace characteristics that have 
been found to be associated with works council presence.
15 Thus, for example, it 
can be seen that establishments abandoning their works councils between 1998 
and 2000 had on average fewer employees than those plants that always had a 
works council. In addition, establishments abandoning a works council were less 
likely to be branch plants, to be located in Western Germany, to apply a bargaining 
agreement, and to report a good or very good profit situation compared with plants 
which always had a works council. Comparing plants that set up a works council 
with those that never had one, it appears that the former group are more likely to 
be branch plants, to be located in Western Germany, to be a family-owned firm, to 
report good profits, and to apply a sectoral-level bargaining agreement than plants 
that never had a works council. 
 
These differences are eliminated in the matching approach, to which we next turn. 
To repeat, for each treated plant we search in the same region (West versus East) 
and in the same sector (from a total of nine) for the most similar plant in terms of 
the propensity score (obtained from the probit regression) in the control group.
16 
Note that in this process each matched establishment from the control group is 
never used more than once to form a statistical twin (one-to-one matching), so that 
the results reported below are based on totally different pairs of treated and non-
treated plants. The matched non-treated establishments form the new control 
group. 
 
(Table 6 near here) 
 
                                            
15   Note that the number of observations now exceeds those reported in Tables 1 through 3, 
because of missing values for the lagged dependent variables and sales growth in the 
investment equations. 




Table 6 indicates that the matching was successful. A comparison of the mean 
values of variables in 1998 for the two pairs of treated and control plants (works 
council formation versus ‘never present,’ and works council abandonment versus 
‘always present’) shows no statistically significant differences at conventional 
levels.
17 In other words, the respective treated and control groups are very similar. 
However, the sample of plants setting up a works council is now only 25, while that 
identified as abandoning a works council falls to 21.
18 This reduction occurs 
because no comparable twin (in the same sector and region) could be found for 
the plants that dropped out of the analysis. More technically, the propensity score 
of the treated unit was outside the estimated propensity score distribution of the 
untreated plants. 
 
(Table 7 near here) 
 
Mean values of our two investment outcome variables for the respective plant-
types are reported in Table  7. All probability values imply that the observed 
differences between the treated and untreated groups are statistically insignificant. 
Again, we do not find evidence that either setting up a works council inhibits 
investment in subsequent years or abandoning a works council increases future 
investment. This result is consistent across all three approaches applied and casts 




Using establishment panel data, we have applied three alternative estimation 
strategies – involving parametric and nonparametric methods – in order to 
determine the impact if any of works councils on investments in tangible capital. 
We can find no evidence that the formation (dissolution) of a works council has an 
unfavorable (beneficial) effect on investment. Nor for that matter do we find that 
changes in work council status have a positive effect on the investment bottom 
line. These are important results that fill a hole in the developing German literature 
on the effects of works councils on firm performance. They are also important 
                                            
17  The sole exception being establishment formation during the last five years, which is now more 
likely (and statistically significant at the .05 level) for plants that always had a works council than 
for those plants that abandoned their works councils between 1998 and 2000. 
18  For expansion investment, the number of comparable plants is 24 (setting up vs. never present) 
and 20 (abandoning vs. always present), respectively.  
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more generally in addressing the hold-up problem, and in pointing to institutional 
arrangements that might attenuate that problem (see Freeman and Lazear, 1995). 
That said, our results have to be interpreted with some care. There is first the 
issue of the small number of plants recording a change in works council regime 
over the sample period, making it difficult to detect statistically significant 
differences in investment behavior. Then there is the question of the model. The 
insignificant overall impact of works councils on investment might in practice 
reflect opposing effects of works councils on investment, with capital-labor 
substitution being offset by opposing effects on capital formation stemming from 
rent seeking.  
 
Finally, there is the issue of perception. Despite our findings, and some potentially 
corroboratory evidence on investments in intangible capital (e.g. Schnabel and 
Wagner, 1994; Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2001; Kraft and Stank, 2004), 
both anecdotal evidence and surveys of businessmen indicate that international 
investors are seemingly reluctant to invest in Germany because of that country’s 
(little understood) system of codetermination. If this is the case, if codetermination 
does put off foreign investment, then works councils may indeed reduce 
investment in a way that our methodology cannot handle. That said, we suspect 
that the perceptions have more to do with codetermination at the enterprise level 
(where unions and employees can get half of the seats on the supervisory board) 




Table 1:  The Impact of Unionism on Firm Investments in Physical Capital, Selected Studies
a 
Study  Data  Methodology  Union measure and controls  Findings 
1. Hirsch 
(1991) 
Data on 572 publicly traded 
manufacturing companies from 
the NBER R&D Master File, 
1968-80. Data on unionism 
obtained from a special survey 
by the author of Master File 
companies supplemented with 
data from an independent 
Conference Board study. The 
union data pertain to 1977. 
Pooled cross-section, time-series 
estimates plus a two-step panel 
procedure to take account of correlated 
firm-specific error terms.  Dependent 
variable: investment in physical capital. 
Central to the estimation procedure is 
an ‘auxiliary’ profit function to pick up 
the ‘indirect’ effect of unions on 
investment. The study also examines 
union effects on R&D expenditures and 
intensity, patent propensity, advertising 
intensity, and the debt-equity ratio, as 
well as profits and productivity.  
Union coverage, namely the percentage 
of the corporation’s total (North 
American) workforce covered by 
collective bargaining agreements.  Some 
specifications also use a categorical 
measure of union coverage: low, 
medium, and high coverage. Controls 
include firm-level variables (current 
earnings, firm size, capital and R&D 
stocks, and firm sales growth); industry 
variables (concentration, sales growth, 
import penetration, the wage level, and 
industry union density); plus industry and 
year dummies.  
Union coverage reduces investment directly and 
indirectly. The former effect is recouped from the 
union coefficient estimates, the latter from the 
coefficient on the profits measure multiplied by the 
union coefficient from the auxiliary profit equation.  
The union firm with average coverage has 13% 
lower investment than its nonunion counterpart. A 
little under one-half half of this effect is direct and 
the other 7% is via the union effect on profits. 
Investment is not found to decrease continuously 
with respect to union coverage, the bigger effects 
being reported among companies with medium 
coverage.  Main results are broadly supported in 
disaggregated regressions for 19 2-digit industry 





Firm-level data from Compustat 
files for the interval 1970-76 
(n=667), together with PICA 
data on the industry structure of 
the firm’s output market.  Union 
data based on the weighted 
average of the 3-digit industry 
unionization rates (density) 
across the various industries in 
which the firm operates. 
OLS cross-section regression where all 
variables are firm-specific averages 
over the sample period. Dependent 
variable is the natural log of the ratio of 
expenditure on new plant and 
equipment to the book value of existing 
plant and equipment. (Four other 
outcome indicators are also examined; 
the advertising and R&D investment 
ratios, the debt-equity ratio, and the 
annual change in employment – all log 
values). 
Fraction of workers who are union 
members, averaged over the industries in 
which the firm operates. Controls include 
(3) industry-level market structure 
variables, firm-level annual sales and 
rates growth, and a set of 2-digit industry 
dummy variables for the firm’s primary 
industry. 
Statistically significant negative association between 
union density and the plant and equipment 
investment ratio. The elasticity of the plant and 
equipment investment ratio with respect to union 
density is -0.22, implying that a one standard 
deviation (12.9 percentage point, or 35%) change in 
a firm’s unionization rate is associated with a 7.7% 
decrease in this ratio. (The elasticities of 
expenditures on R&D and advertising with respect 
to unionization are larger in absolute terms. 
Unionization also has strongly negative (positive) 





Firm data from Compustat. Firm-
level union measure obtained 
from BLS contract data together 
with firm employment levels 
(from Compustat). Sample sizes 
vary by time interval and sector 
(e.g. around 300 firms for 
manufacturing in 1979-82). 
Two-cross sectional regressions using 
variable means, calculated over 1975-
78 and 1979-82, with separate results 
for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing. Industry fixed-effects, 
random effects, and first-differenced 
models. Dependent variable: ratio of 
investment in plant and equipment to 
sales. (Study also includes three other 
‘investment’ outcomes – R&D/sales, 
advertising/sales, and capital 
stock/employment, as well as 
profitability, and sales and employment 
growth.) 
Share of workers covered by union 
contract. Results of using this measure 
are contrasted with findings based on 
industry unionization rates derived from 
the CPS.  The study focuses in large part 
on deficiencies of using industry average 
unionization rates, while taking note of 
measurement error in the BLS firm-level 
measure. Controls include the four-firm 
concentration ratio and lagged values of 
sales growth and the ratio of R&D to 
sales. 
For manufacturing, the effects on investment of the 
firm-level measure of unionism are significantly 
negative when no other controls are included in the 
industry effects regressions. With controls, the 
effects of union coverage are les precisely 
estimated. For non-manufacturing, the union effects 
with and without controls are positive but poorly 
determined. In general union, effects based on the 
firm-level measure are more precise and robust 
than their counterparts using industry averages. The 
results for the other indicators are said to be 






Data on 722 publicly-traded 
firms from Compustat, averaged 
over the interval 1973-82. Union 
data pertain to 1977 (see row 1 
study). 
Single-equation estimates of the 
determinants of investment, but 
including a predicted union coverage 
variable in addition to actual coverage. 
(The study also considers two other 
outcome indicators: log excess market 
value and employment growth.) 
Share of the firm’s labor force covered by 
a collective agreement. The other key 
regressor is ‘asset specificity,’ which is 
also interacted with the union measure. 
Asset specificity is sequentially proxied 
by value added, the R&D/sales ratio, and 
the selling expense/sales ratio – all in 
logarithms. Industry controls are a 
measure of the volatility of operating 
income, and the average percentage 
change in sales; firm controls include the 
growth in operating income and the sum 
of total liabilities and stockholder’s equity. 
The union coverage effect is strongly negative 
across all specifications, while that of asset 
specificity is strongly positive.  The negative effect 
of unionization is increasing in asset specificity. A 
10% increase in union coverage results in 27% 
lower investment when evaluated at average asset 
specificity (selling expense/sales measure) but 38% 
lower investment when asset specificity is 10% 
above average. 
5. Fallick and 
Hassett 
(1999) 
Firm-level data from the 
Compustat Full Coverage file, 
1962-84. Union data from NLRB 
files. 
OLS and fixed effect estimates of 
investment determination (independent 
variable: investment-to-capital ratio), 
achieved using two approaches. The 
first examines the effect of union 
certification elections on investment in a 
standard tax-adjusted q model. The 
second uses a VAR model to predict 
investment and then regresses the 
forecast errors (or ‘surprises’) on union 
certification.  
The union measure is alternately a 
dummy variable set equal to one if the 
firm experiences a winning union 
representation election or the fraction of a 
firm’s workforce involved in a winning 
election. The controls are the ratio of 
cash flow to capital, the tax-adjusted 
Tobin’s q, and a vector of year dummies.  
The OLS results from the standard q model for the 
union dummy indicate that a typical successful 
certification election reduces the investment-to-
capital ratio by roughly 33%. The fixed effect 
estimates are somewhat weaker at about 29%. For 
the surprises model, investments in firms with 
successful certification elections are over predicted 
in both the OLS and fixed effect estimates. The 
latter are well determined (irrespective of the 
particular unionism variable deployed) and in the 
case of the union dummy very similar to those 
obtained in the q model. The union tax is claimed to 
be equivalent to a doubling of the corporate text 
rate. However, there is little indication of investment 






establishments in two German 
Länder in 1990/91. 
OLS and Least Median of Squares and 
Reweighted Least Squares single 
equation estimates. Dependent 
variables are gross capital stock and 
net capital investment divided by the 
capital stock. (The study also examines 
the effect of worker representation on 
profits, value added, and wages/wage 
drift.) 
The workplace representation measure is 
works council presence. Controls are 
capacity, utilization, firm size, the ratio of 
exports to sales, hours of overtime to 
employee, and a measure of product 
innovation (whether or not the firm 
introduced a new product in 1989). 
Works council presence is associated with 
reductions in gross investment in the range 20 to 
33%. There is no effect on net investment, 
suggesting lower depreciation changes in works 
council plants.  However, although gross investment 
is the preferred measure, the overall performance of 
the investment equations is rather weak and the 
effect of some regressors is on occasion perverse.  
7. Hübler 
(2003) 
1,860 German establishments 
with 101 to 300 employees in 
1991 
Single-equation Tobit-ML estimates of 
investment determination. There are 
three investment measures: the logs of 
ICT investment, other investment, and 
expansion investment. (The study also 
examines indirect effects of works 
councils operating through 
reorganization and training.) 
The workplace representation measure is 
works council presence. Controls include 
the size, productivity, and state of 
technology of an establishment; the legal 
form of the enterprise; and a number of 
reorganization and training measures. 
Works council presence is associated with higher 
investment in all three cases. Instrumental variable 
estimations indicate, however, that this overall effect 
stems exclusively from the indirect effect of works 
council presence on reorganization and training, 
their direct effect being statistically insignificant. 
Notes: 
a For industry-level studies, see Abowd (1989) for the U.S., Odgers and Betts (1997) for Canada, and Denny and Nickell (1992) for the U.K.  
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Table 2:  OLS Regressions of Investment for all Plants 
(Endogenous variable: investment divided by total sales, average of 2000-2002) 
Investment Measure  Total   Expansion 
Works council dummies:     
Works council never present 
(1998: no; 2000: no; 2002: no) 
Reference Group  Reference Group 
Works council formation 





Works council dissolution 





Works council always present 





    






Profit situation of the establishment in 1999 





Number of employees in 2000 
 
4.23e-06    
[1.59] 
2.11e-06    
[1.15] 
Number of employees in 2000 squared  
 
-9.44e-11    
[1.46] 
-4.90e-11    
[1.08] 
Collective agreement in 2000 
(reference category: no collective agreement) 
  
















Total investment divided by total sales  




Expansion investment divided by total sales 
(average of 1997-1999) 
 0.219 
[2.81]*** 






    
Number of observations (n)  2014  1945 
     Works council formation      19        16 
     Works council never present  1309  1277 
     Works council dissolution      26      25 
     Works council always present  
 
  660    627 
    
R
2 0.27  0.11 
Notes:  Huber/White sandwich estimator is used to calculate the standard errors of the 
estimates. |t|-statistics in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the .01, .05, 
and .10 levels, respectively.  
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Table  3:  OLS Regressions of Investment for Groups of Plants with   
       No Change in Works Council Regime 
(Endogenous variable: investment divided by total sales, average of 2000-2002) 
Works council regime  Works council never present 
(1998: no; 2000: no; 2002: no) 
Works council always present 
(1998: yes; 2000: yes; 2002: yes)
Investment measure  Total   Expansion   Total  Expansion  










Profit situation of the establishment in 



















Number of employees in 2000 squared 
 
-5.29e-08    
[0.70]    
-2.36e-10    
[0.00] 




Collective agreement in 2000 
(reference: no collective agreement) 
    




























Total investment divided by total sales  






Expansion investment divided by 






10 industry dummies  yes*** 
 
yes** yes  yes 
Constant  0.104    
[3.80]*** 





















Notes:   Huber/White sandwich estimator is used to calculate the standard errors of the estimates.  
    |t|-statistics in brackets.  
     ***, **, * denote significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.  
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Table 4:   Difference between Observed and Predicted Investment Divided  
      by Total Sales, Average of 2000-2002 
Group  Works council formation 
(1998: no; 2000: yes; 2002: yes) 
Works council dissolution 
(1998: yes; 2000: no; 2002: no) 
Investment measure  Total Expansion Total Expansion
n 19 16 26 25
Mean Observed  0.073 0.035 0.036 0.017
Mean Predicted  -0.047 0.022 0.055 0.024
Mean Difference  0.121 0.013 -0.018 -0.007
t-statistic -1.154 -0.789 2.936*** 1.217
Note:  Predictions on the basis of parameter estimates reported in Table 3. Estimates for plants  
    which never (always) had a works council were used to predict the investment divided by  
    total sales measure for plants setting up (abandoning) a works council.  
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Table 5:   Mean Values of Variables for Plants with Different Works Council  
   Regimes, All Plants 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)   






















n 29  1656    33  771   
Variable
b            
Number of employees  304.1 27.71  .20  50.52  631.1  .00 
Branch plant (dummy: 1 = yes)  0.345  0.057  .00  0.152  0.292  .04 
Economic performance  
(dummy: 1=very good/good) 
0.552 0.377  .08  0.182  0.358  .02 
Share of blue-collar workers 0.596  0.653  .36  0.728  0.609  .03 
Share of part-time employees 0.128  0.154  .50  0.055  0.087 .11 
Share of female employees 0.292 0.365  .12  0.299  0.297  .97 
Eastern Germany (dummy)  0.379 0.603  .02  0.697  0.405  .00 
Collective agreement             
-  at sectoral level (1 = yes) 0.690 0.399  .00  0.515  0.767  .01 
-  at firm level (1 = yes)  0.138  0.061  .25  0.030  0.149  .00 
Establishment formation in the 
last five years (1 = yes) 
0.241 0.337  .25  0.182  0.154  .69 
Legal form of firm (dummy:  
1 = family-owned firm) 
0.069 0.553  .00  0.242  0.125  .13 
Total investment divided by 
total sales (average of 2000-
2002) 
0.065 0.047  .23  0.031  0.081  .00 
Expansion investment divided 
by total sales (average of 2000-
2002)
c 
0.027 0.019  .41  0.014  0.032  .02 
Notes: 
a Two-sample t-test with unequal variance of the hypothesis that difference in the means 
  between (1) and (2) (respectively (3) and (4)) is zero.  
b Unless otherwise stated, information refers to the year 1998.
 
c Number of observations for groups (1), (2), (3) and (4) is 28, 1634, 32 and 760,   




Table 6:   Mean Values of Variables for Plants with Different Works Council  
   Regimes,  Matched  Plants 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)   





















n 25  25    21  21   
Variable
b            
Number of employees  97.68 91.48  .89  67.19  70.48 .85 
Branch plant (dummy: 1 = yes)  0.280  0.320  .76  0.095  0.143  .64 
Economic performance  
(dummy: 1=very good/good) 
0.520 0.440  .58  0.190  0.095 .39 
Share of blue-collar workers 0.589  0.569  .84  0.704  0.705 1.0 
Share of part-time employees 0.141  0.138  .96  0.053  0.093  .46 
Share of female employees 0.299 0.353  .48  0.263  0.295 .66 
Eastern Germany (dummy)  0.440 0.440  1.0  0.619  0.619 1.0 
Collective agreement             
-  at sectoral level (1 = yes) 0.680 0.800  .34  0.571  0.619  .76 
-  at firm level (1 = yes)  0.120  0.040  .31  0.048  0.000  .33 
Establishment formation in the 
last five years (1 = yes) 
0.240 0.280  .75  0.095  0.381 .03 
Legal form of firm (dummy:  
1 = family-owned firm) 
0.080 0.040  .56  0.238  0.143 .44 
Notes: 
a Two-sample t-test with unequal variance of the hypothesis that difference in the means  
    between (1) and (2) (respectively (3) and (4)) is zero. 
  
b Information refers to the year 1998.




Table 7:   Mean Values of Investment for Plants with Different Works  
   Council  Regimes.  Matched  Plants 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)   






















Variable            
Total investment divided by 
total sales (average of 2000-
2002) 
0.060 0.042  .30  0.044  0.043  .96 
n  25 25    21  21   
            
            
Expansion investment divided 
by total sales (average of 2000-
2002) 
0.020 0.018  .80  0.020  0.019  .93 
n 24  24    20  20   
Notes: 
a Two-sample t-test with unequal variance of the hypothesis that difference in the means  
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